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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO. RICHARDSON, INC. 
Plaintiff 
vs 
STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK 
Defendant 
Case Number 980050 
Oral Argument Requested 
Priority 15 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2a-3(2)(I)(1996). The 
final order was entered on December 30, 1997 on Civil Case 96 6910976. The Defendant 
filed his notice of appeal within 30 days on January 16, 1998; the docketing statement was 
filed on February 6, 1998. An April 29, 1998 letter from Supreme Court Deputy Clerk 
Babette May to the Defendant advised the Defendant that his appellant's brief is due on June 
11, 1998. The notice of appeal was filed within 30 days and was therefore timely. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
This appeal addresses three issues. They are: 
1. The changing of a judgement issued by Superior Court in Hartford, 
Connecticut on December 6, 1993 ("Judgement") to include items proposed 
by the attorney for the Plaintiff and not in the original Judgement. As of the 
filing of this brief no written Final Order has been received from the Third 
District Court by the Defendant. However, the verbal Final Order contains the 
following items that are not in the Judgement: a) program documentation, b) 
data files, and c) updates past the date of the Judgement. The Plaintiff seeks 
to include these items by use of a Decision Memorandum, disregarding the 
errors, omissions, and direct contradictions of the Decision Memorandum with 
the Defendants employment contract and, in effect, seeks to imofficially 
reopen the case for judgement without due process of law. 
2. The use of a Decision Memorandum not in evidence at the time of the original 
Judgement, which was proved to contain false, incorrect, and perjured 
statements, to substantiate revisions of the original Judgement by the Plaintiff 
while the use of the same Decision Memorandum was denied to the Defendant 
to substantiate claims by the Defendant. 
3. The handcuffing of the pro se Defendant behind his back during the hearing 
when the final order was issued preventing the Defendant from using his notes 
2 
and thereby presenting his defense of the issues surrounding the use of the 
Decision Memorandum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Judgement, shown in Exhibit A, was issued against the Defendant in Superior 
Court, Hartford, Connecticut on December 6, 1993 without the Defendant being notified of 
the hearing at which witness for the Plaintiff, an attorney in the state of Connecticut, 
committed perjury under oath. The same judge who heard the original case was assigned 
to hear the appeal introduced false evidence, incorrectly reworded statements from original 
employment contracts, subsequently did not correct these errors, and thus found no fault with 
the original decision. The case focused on monies owed the Defendant and computer code 
to which the Plaintiff claimed access after the Plaintiff fired the Defendant and refused to 
pay the Defendant wages and commissions as specified in the Defendant's employment 
contract. These wages and commissions are now estimated to be approximately $2,000,000. 
The Plaintiff sought compliance with the Judgement in the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County in hearings on October 8, 1997, December 17, 1997, and December 30, 1997. 
At these hearings the Third District Court ordered the Defendant to produce items not 
present in the original Judgement. The Defendant objected to this action of the Third 
District Court, citing the Third District Court's previous adherence to only the items 
3 
specifically called for in the Judgement The Third District Court nevertheless ordered the 
Defendant to comply with a revised Judgement prepared by the Plaintiff and pay costs of the 
December 30, 1997 court session In chambers prior to the hearing on December 30, 1997, 
the Defendant was handcuffed behind his back and remained constrained in that manner 
throughout the hearing To present his defense of the use of the wrongful Decision 
Memorandum, the Defendant needed access to items brought into the courtroom, but was 
imable to use these items and thus present his defense It was not known to the Defendant 
that such procedures would be implemented while the Defendant was expected to present 
his defense, and in prior hearings Third District Court did not implement such restraints 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The arguments for reversal of the Final Order are that: 
A. Third District Court of Salt Lake County changed a Judgement from another 
state proposed by the Plaintiffs counsel without reopening the case; 
B. Third District Court of Salt Lake County admitted statements from a Decision 
Memorandum, introduced by the Plaintiff, such Decision Memorandum not 
presented at the hearing at which the original Judgement was made, to 
substantiate claims by the Plaintiff without reopening the case, but did not 
allow the Defendant to present evidence substantiating the incorrect and 
wrongful conclusions from the Decision Memorandum. 
C. At the request of the Defendant, the Third District Court refused to read into 
the record the original Judgement before making a determination that the 
Defendant did or did not comply with that Judgement, and; 
D. The Third District Court handcuffed the pro se Defendant behind his back, 
preventing the Defendant's defense of his objection to the use of the wrongful 
Decision Memorandum and the revised judgement based on it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Defendant claims that the Third District Court does not have the authority to 
change a Judgement without reopening the case, that evidence shown to be wrongful and 
incorrect may not be introduced without a fair hearing and proper cross examination, and 
that a pro se Defendant must be allowed to present a defense, otherwise an attorney should 
be appointed for him. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 1998. 
^ /Anfrr?, <zo^f~z> 
Stephen W. Brockbank 
Defendant - APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On June 11, 1998 a true and correct copy of the Appellant's Brief was sent by U.S. 
first class mail to the attorney for the Plaintiff, Mark E. Wilkey, Fillmore, Belliston & 
Israelson, 3549 North University, Suite 250, Provo, UT 84604. 




DOCKET NO.: CV 93-0703826 
T. O . RICHARDSON COMPANY, INC. 
2 Bridgewater Road, Farmington, CT 
06032-2256 
V. 
STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK 
263 G Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
SUPERIOR COURT 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD/ 
NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 
DECEMBER 6, 1993 
MAY 30, 1996 
Present: Hon. Michael R. Sheldon, Judge 
JUDGMENT 
This action, by Writ, verified Complaint, Affidavit, Application for Temporary 
Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause, seeking damages of 
specific performance, or, in the alternative, money damages for breach of contract, fraud, 
conversion, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-564, and misappropriation of trade secrets, 
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §35-50, et seq.. came to Superior Court on January 5, 1993, 
and thence to December 6,1993, when the Court found in a Hearing in Damages for the 
Plaintiff on all counts of the Complaint and Cross-Complaint whereby the Defendant 
must: 1) disclose all source codes, including uncomplied source codes, to the Plaintiff with 
respect to the Star Program of his Equity Investment Guide; 2) make full disclosure of any 
modification made to the Star Program since his termination in October 1992; 3) provide to 
the Plaintiff on or before December 31, 1993 any software needed to encrypt the source code 
if so encrypted; and 4) pay to the Plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of 
$90,530.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of $12,197.00, and thence to May 30, 
1996, when the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion For Order of Weekly Payments providing 
for weekly payments of $50.00 to the Plaintiff. 
Whereupon, it is adjudged that the Defendant pay to the Plaintiff $90,530.00 
compensatory damages and $12,197.00 exemplary damages in weekly payments of $50.00. 
"
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This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to Stephen 
W. Brockbank, 263 G Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104, on this l&ft day of August, 1997. 
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Exhibit B 
Revised Judgement by the Plaintiff 
Stephen W. Brockbank 
August 21, 1997 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 44111 
Dear Judge Lewis: 
Yesterday, August 20,1997,1 received a letter addressed to you of August 18, 1997 from 
Attorney Mark E. Wilkey together with his prepared NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
("NOTICE")and RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ("RULING"). He had previously sent 
to me, on August 15,1997 a proposed draft of these documents to which I responded to him about 
errors in his draft. He has not responded to the errors I pointed out and has submitted the above 
named documents to your Court. 
Mr. Wilkey stated in his letter that I did not object to his proposed drafts. That is not the 
case. I did object and attempted to clarify the errors with Mr. Wilkey, however he has chosen to file 
the above nevertheless. Therefore, I would like to formally respond to Mr. Wilkey and the proposed 
NOTICE and RULING and am today filing the enclosed OBJECTION TO RULING ON ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE with Oral Argument Requested so that there are no mistakes in interpretation 
of what is to be done to resolve this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Stephen W. Brockbank 
cc: Mark E. Wilkey 
Fillmore Law Offices, Provo, Utah 
enclosures 
263 G Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 - Phone (801) 363-2738 
Stephen W. Brockbank 
263 G Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 363-2738 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T.O. RICHARDSON, INC. 
Plaintiff 
vs 
STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK 
Defendant 
OBJECTION TO ORDER 
Civil No. 96 6910976FJ 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Oral Argument Requested 
The Defendant, having appeared before the Third District Court in the State of Utah ("the 
Court") on August 7, 1997 and having been advised by the Court as to the forthcoming Order to 
comply with a Judgement from the Superior Court in the State of Connecticut ("the Connecticut 
Court") and now before the Court, desires to enter this objection to the proposed RULING ON 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as prepared by Utah counsel for the Plaintiff based on the grounds that 
fraud was committed against the Defendant and the Connecticut Court. Specifically, the Defendant 
submits evidence that will show in this Objection that testimony under oath given by the 
attomey/owner of the Plaintiff, Samuel Bailey, Jr, Esq., to the Connecticut Court was false and was 
known to be false at the time it was given and was given with the intent to defraud the Defendant 
1 
of the Defendant's property. 
The Defendant calls the Courts attention to item number five (5) of the Plaintiffs proposed 
ORDER ON RULING TO SHOW CAUSE, specifically Item B. which reads as follows: 
"5, Defendant Brockbank is hereby ordered to comply with the injunctive portions of the 
Connecticut Judgement with 30 days of August 7, 1997 including, specifically, to: 
A. Disclose to Richardson all source codes, including the uncompiled source 
codes with respect to the STAR computer program: 
£L Disclose to Richardson any modification Brockbank has made with respect 
to the STAR program following the termination of his employment with Richardson: and 
C, Disclose or provide any software or program required to unencrypt the source 
code for Plaintiffs STAR program, if the source code is so encrypted." 
Exhibit A shows an employment agreement letter of November 27, 1991 (the last in a series 
of three employment agreement letters dated August 20,1990, March 19, 1991, and November 27, 
1991) in which the Plaintiff, Samuel Bailey, Jr, Esq. states: 
"If you are no longer employed by the Company, vour future obligation to inform the 
Company about future changes to STAR shall apply only to the STAR programs as 
they exist on the date you leave the Company's employment." 
The Defendant was terminated from the Plaintiff on August 19,1992 and the Defendant filed 
claim for wages and commissions with the Connecticut Department of Labor in November 1992. 
In December 1992 the Plaintiff, Samuel Bailey, Jr, Esq. filed civil suit which the Plaintiff knew 
would prevent the Connecticut Department of Labor to pursue action on the complaint. 
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On December 6, 1993, the Plaintiff, Samuel Bailey, Jr, Esq. gave testimony in the 
Connecticut Court shown on page 19 of an official trial transcript of that hearing in Exhibit B 
(applicable statements underlined) in which Judge Michael Sheldon asks: "And you also claim the 
right, as long as the program, the basic program is the one that existed at the time of his departure, 
do you claim the right to any updates in that program?" The Plaintiff answers: "Yes". This answer 
was in direct contradiction to the letter agreement written by the person giving testimony. 
If it please the Court to know that this hearing was held without the Defendant having 
received notice thereof, and therefore was not present to defend against this obviously false 
statement. Numerous other false testimony was also given at that hearing, but is not directly 
involved in the RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE now before the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant and Plaintiff entered into the letter agreement of November 27, 1992 for the 
express purpose of preventing the Plaintiff from terminating the Defendant and then having rights 
to the Defendant's property in perpetuity, recognizing that it would be fraudulent for the Plaintiff 
to acquire access to the Defendant's intellectual property and then terminate the Defendant with 
rights to future modifications without future compensation. The Plaintiff then knowingly and with 
intent gave false testimony to the Connecticut Court with impunity because there would be no cross 
examination since the Defendant did not receive notice of the hearing and was not present. 
3 
PRAYER 
The Defendant therefore asks the Court to modify its RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE and set aside the Judgement until the fraud is removed from the Plaintiffs proposed Order. 
Specifically that Paragraph 5. B reflect the original contract and read as follows: 
"5. B. Disclose to Richardson any modification made to the STAR program as it 
existed on the date Brockbank left the Company's employment which was on August 19, 1992." 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 1997. 
Stephen W. Brockbank, Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 14th day of August, 1997 a true and correct copy of the foregoing, including Exhibits 
A and B was sent to Mark E. Wilkey at Filmore, Belliston & Israelsen via U.S. first class mail at 
3549 N. University Ave. - Suite 250, Provo, UT 84604. 
Stephen W. Brockbank, Defendant 
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Exhibit A 
Letter Agreement by Plaintiff of November 27, 1992 
T. O. Richardson Company, Inc. 
Investment Advisor 
November 27, 1991 
Stephen W. Brockbank 
Senior Vice President 
T.O. Richardson Company, Inc. 
11 Main Street 
Farmington, CT 06032 
Dear Steve: 
This letter will clarify and modify our prior agreements 
concerning your employment. Your employment is extended to 
August 31, 1992 on the same terms as set forth in our agree-
ments of August 20, 1990 and March 19, 1991. The Company 
will notify you 90 days in advance if it intends not to 
continue your draw after August 31, 1992, or for any period 
thereafter. 
You will provide the Company with all source codes, 
documentation, input, limit factors and all other material 
information regarding the use and operation of EIG, as soon 
as possible and from time to time, in such form as the Com-
pany may reasonably reguest. In addition, you will provide 
the Company with full information concerning any modifica-
tions you make to EIG at any time in the future. If ycpu are 
no longer employed by the Company, your obligation to inform 
the Company about future changes to'£is snail apply oniy ro 
the EIQ pyogyams as they exist on the date you leave the 
Company's employment. 
The Company and you will enter into a non-disclosure 
agreement which provides that neither you nor the Company 
shall disclose EIG or any other of the company's proprietary 
confidential information to anyone except principals of the 
Company and certain consultants to the Company who are bound 
to a comprehensive non-disclosure agreement. 
Very truly yours, 
T.O. RICHARDSON COMPANY, INC. 
J&S& 
President 
AGREED to this 21 4h day olVWnrtuih**' . 1991: 
Exhibit B 
Partial Transcript of Hearing of December 6, 1992 
specifically 
Cover Page, Page 19, and Certification of 33 Pages 
19 
A In the State of Connecticut, yes. 
Q Do you claim any exclusive right to the use of this now 
that he's left you or just the right to use it along with him? 
A No, the right to use it along with him. 
0 And you claim also the right, as long as the orogram. 
the basic program is the one that existed at the time of his 
departure, do you claim the right to any updates in that 
program? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Horan, call your next 
wi tness? 
MR. HORAN: I ask that this be marked Exhibit D 
for identification. 
BY MR. HORAN: 
Q Handing you Plaintiff's D, do you recognize this? 
A This is a brochure which describes the component of EIG 
called the STAR portfolio. And STAR stands for — 
Q Well rather than explaining — do you recognize it? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And do you know from what source it emanates? 
A This is a brochure that is being used currently by Mr. 
Brockbank for marketing investment advice to clients for his 
current employer. 
Q Using STAR? 
A Using STAR. 
MR. HORAN: Thank you. That's all I have, Mr. 
Bailey. I ask that Exhibit D be admitted? 
MO. CV93-O703826S 
T. ~. RICHARDSON 
VS. 
STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK 
SUPERIOR COURT 
HAPTFORD/NEW BRITAIN J[) 
AT HAR"ORD 
DECEMBER 6, 1993 
B e f o r e : 
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. SHELDON, JUDGE 
A o o e a r a n c e 
For the Plaintiff: 
Brian Horan, Esq. 
For the Defendant: 
Not Present 
Ann C. Wolanin 
Court Monitor 
NO. CV93-0703826S T. 0. RICHARDSON COMPANY V. STEPHEN W. 
BROCKBANK 
C E R T I F I C A T I O N 
I hereby certify the foregoing is transcript of the above-
entitled matter heard before the Honorable Michael R. Sheldon, 
Judge, Superior Court for the Hartford/New Britain Judicial 
District on the 6th day of December, 1993 at Hartford, 
Connecti cut. 
Dated this 16th day of September, 1994 at Hartford, 
Connecti cut. 
Ann C. Wolanin, Court Monitor 
Exhibit C 
False Evidence in the Memorandum of Decision 
Superior Court, Hartford, Connecticut 
DOCKET NO. CV93-0703826 
T.O. RICHARDSON COMPANY, INC, 
V. 
STEPHEN W. BROCKBANK 
SUPERIOR COURT 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
HARTFORD/NEW BRITAIN 
AT HARTFORD 
APRIL 13, 1995 
MOTION TO REVISE MEMORANDUM OF DECISION OF MARCH 23, 1995 
BASED ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE WITH CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
On March 23, 1995 the Superior Court (Sheldon, J) issued a 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO REOPEN JUDGEMENT (»Memorandum 
3/23/95"), shown in Exhibit I, denying the defendant's motion to 
reopen judgement. The defendant, Stephen W. Brockbank, submits to 
the Court ITEMS 1 - 9 used in the Memorandum 3/23/95 that are 
contrary to original evidence in the contract documents and facts 
before the Court and respectfully requests the Court to revise its 
Memorandum in view of these discovered differences upon which the 
decision was rendered and order the plaintiff to honor its 
contracted payments to the defendant specified in ITEM 9. 
ITEM 1 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 2. The Court is referring to 
paragraph 3 of the August 20, 1990 (Exhibit III) employment 
contract shown in Exhibit III. The Court reads the 8/20/90 
contract as follows: 
"b. the defendant would bring with him to the plaintiff the 
Equity Investment Guide ("EIG"), a computer software package 
developed and then being improved upon by the defendant that 
uses economic and financial information to manage individual 
investment portfolios." (underlines added by defendant). 
Comment: As shown in Exhibit III, page 3, paragraph 3, the above 
underlined quote by the Court does not appear. In the 8/20/95 
contract it was not stated and is not true that future development 
of EIG/STAR was to be done for the Plaintiff. EIG/STAR was 
complete on arrival and had been used to manage money since 1986 at 
Gardner & Preston Moss in Boston, MA and at Wright Investors' 
Service in Bridgeport, CT. And there were no improvements to 
EIG/STAR done by the defendant while in the employ of the 
plaintiff. Throughout this case, the plaintiff has wrongly implied 
that the plaintiff extended large sums of money to the defendant to 
develop and improve EIG\STAR. This hearsay is baseless and without 
proof and has been fabricated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff gave 
this information as testimony under oath and it has somehow been 
accepted by the Court as fact. 
ITEM 2 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 2. The Court is referring to 
paragraph 3 of the August 20, 1990 (Exhibit III) employment 
contract shown in Exhibit III. The Court reads the 8/20/90 
contract as follows: 
"b. the Plaintiff would have exclusive rights to use EIG 
while the Defendant was an employee of the Plaintiff, and, 
should the Defendant leave the Plaintiff's employ, the 
Plaintiff would have the right to continue to use EIG but 
would incur the additional obligation of making a royalty 
payment to the Defendant." 
Comment: As shown in Exhibit III, page 3, paragraph 3, the 
applicable statement in the 8/20/90 contract is: 
"If you leave the employment of the company involuntarily, the 
company may acquire exclusive rights to use EIG at a price to 
be agreed upon or may continue to use EIG for a royalty 
5 
payment to you of 10% of the company's net income from money 
under management using EIG." 
The Plaintiff made no attempt to acquire EIG/STAR when the 
Defendant was fired on August 16, 1990 or for three months 
thereafter. The Plaintiff began the lawsuit only after the 
Defendant filed for back wages an commissions with the Connecticut 
Department Of Labor on November 10, 1990. 
ITEM 3 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 3. The Court is referring to 
page 1, paragraph 2 and page 3, item (6) of the March 19, 1991 
employment contract extension shown in Exhibit IV. The Court reads 
the 3/19/91 contract as follows: 
"a. the Defendant would continue to be responsible for 
providing wholesale services to the airline pilot marketing 
program; and 
b. as set forth in the 1990 Agreement, the Defendant would 
continue to provide the Plaintiff with a detailed explanation 
of the workings of EIG." 
Comment: As shown in Exhibit IV, page 1, paragraph 2, and page 3, 
item (6) the applicable statements in the 3/19/91 contract are: 
"a. For revenue generated from the Airline Pilot program, the 
separate agreement for compensation and equity participation 
in TOR with SWB stands as specified; and 
b. SWB shall continue to provide the Company with a detailed 
explanation of the workings of the STAR program and shall 
support other sales efforts within the Company for the STAR 
program without additional compensation." Underlines by 
Defendant. 
It is clear in the actual quote of (a.) that the Defendant 
receives all of his compensation from the Airline Pilot program and 
clear from (b.) that the Plaintiff did not intend to compensate the 
Defendant in any way for sales efforts pertaining to STAR unless it 
3 
became successful. In no case was money spent for the development 
of STAR as the Plaintiff has claimed. 
ITEM 4 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 3. The Court is referring to 
paragraph 2 of the November 27, 1991 employment contract extension 
shown in Exhibit V. The Court reads the 11/27/91 contract as 
follows: 
Ma. the Defendant would provide the Plaintiff with all source 
codes, documentation, input, limit factors, and all ocher 
material information necessary to the use and generation of 
EIG (collectively, "Source Code and Documentation, as socn as 
possible and from time to time, in such form as the Plaintiff 
might reasonably request. 
b. the Defendant would provide the Plaintiff with full 
information regarding any modifications he made to EIG at anv 
time in the future; and 
c. the Plaintiff and the Defendant would enter into a non-
disclosure agreement whereby neither party would disclose EIG 
or any other of the Plaintiff's property or confidential 
information or trade secrets." Underlines by Defendant. 
Comment: As shown in Exhibit V, paragraph 2, the 11/2 7/91 contract 
says: 
" You will provide the Company with all source codes, 
documentation, input, limit factors and all other material 
information regarding the use and operation of EIG, as soon as 
possible and from time to time, in such form as the Company 
may reasonably request. In addition, you will provide the 
Company with full information concerning any modifications you 
make to EIG at any time in the future. If you are no longer 
employed by the Company, your obligation to inform the Company 
about future changes to EIG shall apply only to the EIG 
programs as they exist on the date you leave the Company's 
employment." 
There is a large and material difference between being able 1} 
to generate the EIG program and )2 to operate the EIG program. The 
first difference is that in order to be able to generate the 
complete EIG program, the proprietary modules in EIG with the 
4 
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investment formulae would have to be open to inspection, copy and 
change. This would violate the intellectual property rights of the 
Defendant and make any payment for EIG mute and unnecessary. The 
second difference is that to be able to generate and market STAR 
outside the control of the owner causes the possibility of 
contamination of the algorithm and a potential product liability 
case. Therefore, it was not granted to the Plaintiff to be able to 
generate the EIG program in its entirety. The Plaintiff had the 
ability to generate any of the data input, manipulation and 
sequencing operations in EIG as well as any of the accounting and 
reporting modules. In addition, the Plaintiff could write any 
investment algorithm using EIG/STAR data or data from outside 
sources to verify the veracity of the EIG/STAR programs. The 
Plaintiff decided against this alternative for cost reasons. 
The 11/27/91 agreement clearly states that if the Plaintiff 
acquires usage of EIG, the Defendant need only supply changes up to 
termination of employment. This clause was specifically worded to 
prevent the Plaintiff from acquiring EIG, then firing the Defendant 
and then have access to all future modification to EIG by the 
Defendant without compensation. This provision of the contract 
nullifies any claim by the Plaintiff for subsequent EIG/STAR 
modifications. 
ITEM 5 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 5, paragraph 1, last sentence, 
the Court, referring to Exhibits III, IV and V, states that: 
"On August 19, 1992, however the plaintiff terminated the 
defendant's employment for wilful failure to perform under the 
5 
terms of the above-described agreements." 
Comment: As shown in Exhibit VI, the Plaintiff wrote to the 
Defendant on November 13, 1992, describing the reasons for 
termination on August 19, 1992, three months earlier and submitted 
a back dated pink slip covering two months of employment ( 8/20/92 
to 10/15/92 ). The Plaintiff dated the pink slip August 19, 1992, 
but noted his signature as 11/13/92. This quick effort by the 
Plaintiff to generate a cover up for the Plaintiff's termination of 
the defendant without cause is supported by the Defendants November 
10, 1992 Statement Of Claim For Wages filed with the Connecticut 
Department Of Labor. 
ITEM 6 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 11, paragraph 2, the Court 
states the testimony of Mr. Bailey as follows: 
" As relief for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff 
sought to obtain a copy of the Source Code and Documentation, 
as described in its agreements with the defendant, as well as 
money damages for all the monies it was fraudulently induced 
to pay the defendant to develop EIG. At no point did Mr. 
Bailey testify that the plaintiff owned EIG. Rather, he 
claimed that the plaintiff's contracts with the defendant gave 
it the right to use EIG and its source codes -- exclusively 
while he worked for the plaintiff, non-exclusively thereafter 
-- and to receive updates of the basic program even after the 
termination of the defendant's employment." Underlines by 
Defendant. 
Comment: As shown in Exhibit IV, page 3, item (6) the applicable 
statement in the 3/19/91 contract is: 
11
 SWB shall continue to provide the Company with a detailed 
explanation of the workings of the STAR program and shall 
support other sales efforts within the Company for the STAR 




It is a clear statement that no monies are paid to che 
Defendant for any work related to STAR and that the Plaintiff did 
not intend to compensate the Defendant in any way for sales efforts 
pertaining to STAR. In no case, even by contractual evidence, was 
money spent for the development of STAR as the Plaintiff claims. 
As shown in Exhibit V, paragraph 2, the 11/27/91 contract 
says: 
" You will provide the Company with all source codes, 
documentation, input, limit factors and all other material 
information regarding the use and operation of EIG, as soon as 
possible and from time to time, in such form as the Company 
may reasonably request. In addition, you will provide the 
Company with full information concerning any modifications you 
make to EIG at any time in the future. If you are no longer 
employed by the Company, your obligation to inform the Company 
about future changes to EIG shall apply only to the EIG 
programs as they exist on the date you leave the Company's 
employment." 
This statement in the non-disclosure contract clearly limits 
the Plaintiff's claim on EIG/STAR, should it be bone fide, to the 
state of EIG/STAR as it existed at the time of termination. 
ITEM 7 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 11, paragraph 2, the Court 
states the testimony of Ms. Messer-Russo as follows: 
11
 Ms. Messer-Russo then testified that she had calculated 
the total damages which the plaintiff had sustained by reason 
of the defendant's total breach of his contractual obligations 
to be $163,000. Those damages included $33,277 for expenses 
incurred by the defendant for the further development of EIG, 
$117,692 in total salary paid to the defendant, and $12,197 in 
attorney's fees to prosecute this action. 
Comment: As shown in Exhibit IV, page 1, paragraph 2, and page 3, 
item (6) the applicable statements in the 3/19/91 contract are: 
7 
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"a. For revenue generated from the Airline Pilot program, the 
separate agreement for compensation and equity participation 
in TOR with SWB stands as specified; and 
b. SWB shall continue to provide the Company with a detailed 
explanation of the workings of the STAR program and shall 
support other sales efforts within the Company for the STAR 
program without additional compensation." Underlines by 
Defendant. 
Since the Defendant's salary was $60,000 per year and the 
Defendant was in the employ of the Plaintiff for two years, it is 
clear in the actual quote of (a.) that the Defendant receives all 
of his compensation from his services to the Airline Pilot program 
and clear from (b.) that the Plaintiff did not intend to nor did in 
fact compensate the Defendant in any way for sales efforts 
pertaining to STAR. In no case was money spent for the development 
of STAR as the Plaintiff as Ms. Messer-Russo has testified. To 
prove this point the Court may ask Ms. Messer-Russo for time card 
verification of the Defendant's hourly schedule. 
ITEM 8 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 17, last sentence, the Court 
opinion as follows: 
11
 Indeed the several contracts presented to the Court made 
it clear at all times that the plaintiff's legitimate 
entitlement thereunder was not only to have EIG/STAR software 
on their premises, available for their use without the 
assistance of the defendant, but to have as well all source 
codes and other documentation that were necessary to make 
wholly independent use of EIG/STAR without the defendant's 
assistance. Failure of the defendant to supply the plaintiff 
with this information has prevented the plaintiff from usina 
EIG/STAR at any time despite its substantial payments of 
salary to the defendant to develop the program" 
Comment: 
Source Codes: The words use and using in this context to not 
8 
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give the plaintiff the opportunity to modify, change or examine 
trade secrets of the defendant incorporated in EIG/STAR just: as the 
use or using a word processing program like WORD or Word Perfect, 
a spreadsheet program like Lotusl23 or Microsoft Excel, etc does 
not give the person evaluating the program permission to examine 
the source code of those programs. This is an industry standard 
which expert testimony can well establish. The defendant has 
thirteen years experience as a systems engineer with International 
Business Machines Corporation (1967-1980, employee ID 911447, 
verifiable at IBM HQ, Armonk, New York) and has supervised che 
evaluation of many IBM proprietary software. Organizations 
performing the evaluation, just like the plaintiff, had full use of 
the programs and could manipulate input data, output reports and 
the way in which the information was processed, just like the 
plaintiff was able to do with EIG/STAR. They could not, however, 
unless they purchased the program, examine the source code of che 
proprietary modules and neither could the plaintiff. The obvious 
reason is that these codes are intellectual property; once given it 
can not be taken back. EIG/STAR was evaluated and used by 
Connecticut Mutual Insurance Company, Phoenix Mutual Insurance 
Company, Gardner & Preston Moss, and Wright Investors' Service. In 
no case was the proprietary source code revealed except for Wright 
Investors' Service who purchased the program after evaluating it 
for one year. The defendant knows for a surety the plaintiff is 
not an expert in this field nor is the attorney for the plaintiff 
as admitted in deposition of the defendant. In November 1991, zhe 
9 
defendant hired an expert software attorney to draft a suitable 
document to allow the plaintiff access to the information the 
plaintiff wanted. When a draft Software Licensing Agreement of 
November 20, 1991, Exhibit VII, from Attorney Houston P. Lowrey was 
presented to the plaintiff, the plaintiff dismissed the draft 
document and summarily fired the defendant. The plaintiff then 
proceeded to draft his own document that was unsuitable to permit 
what was needed to protect the defendant. 
Substantial payments of salary to develop the program: It has 
already been established several times in this motion, ITEM3 and 
ITEM6, that the defendant's salary was solely as a result of work 
for the plaintiff's airline pilot program and that the defendant 
would promote STAR without additional compensation. 
As shown in Exhibit IV, page 1, paragraph 2, and page 3, item (6) 
the applicable statements in the 3/19/91 contract are: 
"a. For revenue generated from the Airline Pilot program, the 
separate agreement for compensation and equity participation 
in TOR with SWB stands as specified; and 
b. SWB shall continue to provide the Company with a detailed 
explanation of the workings of the STAR program and shall 
support other sales efforts within the Company for the STAR 
program without additional compensation." Underlines by 
Defendant. 
Since the Defendant's salary was $60,000 per year and the 
Defendant was in the employ of the Plaintiff for two years, it is 
clear in the actual quote of (a.) that the Defendant receives all 
of his compensation from his services to the Airline Pilot program 
and clear from (b.) that the Plaintiff did not intend to nor did in 
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fact compensate the Defendant in any way for sales efforts 
pertaining to STAR. In no case was money spent for the development 
of STAR as the Plaintiff has testified. 
ITEM 9 Memorandum 3/23/95, Page 11, last sentence, the Court 
restates testimony as follows: 
" Ms. Messer-Russo then testified that she calculated the 
total damages which the plaintiff had sustained by reason of 
the defendant's breech of his contractual obligations to be 
$163,000. 
Comment: 
It is actually the plaintiff who owes the defendant large 
ongoing sums of money. Page 1, paragraph 2. (A) (2) and page 5, 
paragraph 9. of the August 20, 1990 contract states: 
"(2) After 12 months: 20 basis points, if the money is 
managed at 200 basis points, but not to exceed 10% of the 
company's net fee for money managed at less than 200 
basis points, for as long as the money is under 
management and you are a registered broker. 
9. This agreement may be terminated by the company at 
any time for cause, but you shall continue to be entitled 
to commissions on any money under management for so long 
as you are eligible to receive such commissions under 
federal or state securities laws. Cause shall mean (1) 
loss or suspension of securities licenses by you, (2) 
disclosure of the Sentry Formula, (3) disloyalty to the 
company. In addition, this agreement may be terminated 
at the end of the first 15 months for non-performance, 
which means that you shall not have produced at least 
$10,000,000 of wholesale and/or retail new accounts in 
the first 15 months of employment." Underlines by 
defendant. 
The defendant is a registered agent with the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), broker # 1715572 
and holds Series 7 and 63 qualifications. The plaintiff has 
approximately $60,000,000 under management as of March 1995 in the 
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airline pilot program and the defendant's approximate commissions 
are: 
($60,000,000) (.002) $120,000 per year 
These commissions are due and payable from the time the defendant 
left the employ of the plaintiff on the amounts under management at 
the end of years 1992, 1993 and 1994. 
SUMMARY 
The defendant recognizes the complexities of the contracts the 
plaintiff has created and the nature of the plaintiff's complaint 
to avoid going before the Department Of Labor or to avoid paying 
the defendant commissions on rightly earned share of revenues from 
money placed under management in the airline pilot program. The 
defendant asks the Court to revise its Memorandum based on the 
actual contract language that has been shown in ITEMS 1 - 9 in this-
Motion. Finally, the defendant asks the Court to order the 
plaintiff to fulfil its obligation to pay the defendant commissions 
stated in the plaintiff's contract of 8/20/95, ITEM9. 
DEFENDANT 
Stephen W. Brockbank 
Stephen W. Brockbank, pro se 
263 G Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801) 596-9708 
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